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IMPROVING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT AND CONFUSION
BETWEEN THE LUXEMBOURG AND
STRASBOURG COURTS
Joseph R. Wetzel*
INTRODUCTION

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the European Court of Justice'
("ECJ") began recognizing the European Community's2 growing
potential to influence fundamental rights protection,3 and started
adjudicating in this area.' The national courts of the Member States
challenged the ECJ's authority to be a fundamental rights guardian.'
To defeat this challenge and preserve its supremacy within the
Community legal order, the ECJ repeatedly asserted the EC's
commitment to fundamental rights protection.' The ECJ continued to
expand the scope of its review powers well into the ambit of
fundamental rights protection, even at the national level.7
*J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law; A.B., 2000, Brown
University. I would like to thank my fianc6e, Emily, for her love and support.
1. See infra Part I.A. This Note uses the terms "European Court of Justice,"
"ECJ," and "Luxembourg Court" interchangeably.
2. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. This Note spans the entire life of the
European Economic Community, including its transformation into the current
European Union. The terms "EEC," "European Community," "European Union,"
"Community," "EC," and "EU" are used interchangeably throughout the Note. For
the purposes of this Note, each term refers to the supranational body governed by the
ECJ.
3. See Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union 25 (2d ed. 1999). By fundamental
rights, I mean those human rights so basic and universal as to constitute "an essential
ingredient of any constitutional democracy." See id. at 302. Naturally, there will be
debate as to what constitutes "an essential ingredient of democracy." That important
discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. For the purposes of this Note, the reader
should think abstractly of "basic human rights," or of the rights most critical to a wellfunctioning human society, when attempting to define "fundamental rights."
4. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 97, 102-03, 108-10 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 98-101, 104-07, 111-12 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part I.B.1. "The ECJ's assumption of competence for human rights
review not only vis--vis the Community institutions, but also vis- -vis the Member
States, results in a situation where the Community may be said to have moved from
'respecting' to 'ensuring' human rights." Rick Lawson, Confusion and Conflict?
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Although the ECJ's newfound commitment to fundamental rights
protection should benefit the Member States, the Court's expanded
jurisprudence causes some problems. For one, the ECJ's commitment
to fundamental rights originated as a politically motivated attempt to
protect the Court's supremacy, calling into question the Court's
sincere desire to effectively protect fundamental rights.' The ECJ
sought not to match the Member States' standards, but to make the
jurisdictional claim that the ECJ may assert an autonomous
community legal standard.
As a jurisdictional claim, the ECJ's
decision to adopt fundamental rights threatens to interfere with
existing European fundamental rights protection standards, such as
that established by the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also known as the European
Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR").'
The ECHR represents a rights protection standard agreed upon by
all European Union Member States and, although the EU itself has
not signed the Convention,'' it provides a natural starting point for
discussing Community-wide human rights protection. 2 Failure by the
EU to accede to the ECHR has left gaps in the Convention's
protection, as claims against Community organs cannot be brought
Diverging litterpretaiiolts ofthc Europeani Convention on Human
n
Rights in Strasbourg

and Luxenbourg, in 3 The Dynamics of lthe Protection of Human Rights in Europe
219, 224 (Rick Lawson & Matthijs de Blois eds., 1994).

8. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Methods of Protection: Towards a Second and Third
Generation of Protection, in Hunlian Rights and the European Community: Methods

of Protection 555, 581 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 1991) (suggesting that the ECJ's
commitment to fundamental rights protection came as "an attempt to protect the
concept of supremacy").

9. Anne-Marieke Widmann, Note, Article 53: Undermining the Impact of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8 Colum. J. Eur. L. 342, 347 (2002) ("ITihe ECJ's

'undamental rights jurisprudence does not constitute a substantive effort to match
Member State standards, but rather amounts to a Jurisdictional claim, asserting the
Court's right to impose an aulononous Community standard which cannot he derived
by national courts.,,).
10. The ECHR, or Convention, includes a catalogue of fundamental rights
approved by the member states of tihe Council o1' Europe. See Convention for the
Protection of luman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Nov. 4,1950, Europ. T.S.
No. 5, available at http://conventioiis.coe.iiit/treaty/en/Freaties/Html/005.htm
Ihereinafter ECHR]. The European Commission on Human Rights, whose approval
was required to send a case before the European Court of' Human Rights in
Strasbourg, France, originally heard claims arising under the Convention. See id.
Protocol 11.Protocol II to the Convention dismantled the Commission, leaving the
Strasbourg Court to handle all claims directly from the applicants. See id. The states,
by signing the agreement, are bound to secure to anyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms contained in the Convention. See id. art. 1.
11.See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
12. Each of the EU Member States also belongs to the Council of Europe. See
Dates of Ratification, (it http://www.echr.coe.int/Engl/Edocs/DatesOfRatifications.
html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003) (listing dates of ratification ol ECH R and subsequent
Protocols
by
Council
of
Europe
members):
Member
States, at
http://europa,.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2003) (listing Member States of
the European Union).
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before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. 3 This
raises the specter of the ECJ deciding a case that obligates a Member
State to enact legislation violating the ECHR. When assessing the
immediate future of human rights protection within the EU, one must
ask: How can we guarantee the ECHR's uniform application across
the EU and the rest of Europe in light of the ECJ's intense interest in
maintaining its supremacy, as well as an autonomous Community
legal order? For the moment, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union" ("Charter") presents the most promising
solution: affirming a strong fundamental rights protection standard
and harmonizing the ECHR's interpretations by the European Court
of Human Rights and the ECJ. Only when the EU secures this
baseline of fundamental rights protection can the human rights
protection standards within the European Union develop further.
This Note examines the ECJ's role as a fundamental rights
protector within the European Union and how the Court's increased
involvement in adjudicating fundamental rights claims has led to
conflicting ECHR interpretations by the ECJ and Strasbourg Court.
The Note determines that the Nice Charter provides the best possible
means to restore uniformity to the ECHR's interpretation.
Part I of this Note provides a historical background of fundamental
rights protection within the European Union. Part L.A gives a brief
history of the European Court of Justice. This section examines the
ECJ's rise as a constitutional court for the European Community
through the development of its judicial review powers and the
extension of these powers to affect legislation at the national level
within EU Member States."5 Part I.B.1 outlines early fundamental
rights cases in Luxembourg, describing how these cases sprang from
market-related concerns surrounding employees' rights in the
workplace. This section describes the expansion of fundamental
rights protection within the EU as a direct response to certain national
courts' challenges to ECJ supremacy that alleged inadequate rights
protection at the EU level.'" Part I.B.2 discusses the failure of the
proposed EC accession to the ECHR, which otherwise would have
enhanced fundamental rights protection in the EU by eliminating any
gaps in protection between the EU rights protection system and that
of the ECHR. 7 Part I.C introduces the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union and explains the motivations behind its
drafting."
13. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
14. 2001 O.J. (C 364) 1, available at http://ue.eu.int/df/docs/en/CharteEN.pdf
thereinafter Charter].
Other names for the Charter include the European
Fundamental Rights Charter and the Nice Charter.
15. See infra notes 25-86 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 90-114 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
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In Part I.A, this Note describes the potential problems resulting
from overlapping jurisdiction within the current two-court
international rights protection system in Europe. 9 Part lI.B outlines
three possible solutions: (1) to revisit the possibility of EU accession
to the ECHR, (2) to create a referral mechanism between the
Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts, and (3) to establish a standard
within the EU that will prevent the ECJ from reducing the scope of
the Convention's fundamental rights as interpreted by the Strasbourg
Court."'
Part III considers the merits of each solution. 2' Part III.A suggests
that neither the accession nor the referral solution solves the twocourt problem due to the political implications of relinquishing review
powers for the ECJ.22 Part II.B posits that the Nice Charter will
provide an enhanced rights protection system within the EU and a
harmonization mechanism for the ECHR jurisprudences of both
courts-and therefore reduce the potential for harmful divergent
ECHR interpretations. 23 Part III.C examines the probability that the
Nice Charter will succeed in solving the two-court problem when
applied in the real world, either in its current, non-binding status or in
its potential status as part of the treaties.2 4 Two factors weigh heavily
in this evaluation: (1) whether the Charter allows for a rights
protection standard greater than or equal to that provided under the
ECHR, and (2) whether the Charter promotes a convergence of the
fundamental rights jurisprudences of the two courts. This Note
concludes that, because the ECJ is unlikely to reverse its position on
sharing its review powers with another court, implementing the Nice
Charter, as either "soft" or binding law, represents a critical step in
strengthening fundamental rights protection not only within the
European Union, but also throughout Europe.
I. A SUPREME COURT FOR EUROPE

Before evaluating the ECJ's role in fundamental rights protection
within the EU, the Court's origins-and particularly the sources of the
Court's authority, legitimacy, and the scope of its judicial review
powers-need to be considered. This section begins by charting the
ECJ's inception and the expansion of its authority within the
European Community. After detailing the Court's growing influence
within the European Union, this section describes the genesis of
fundamental rights protection at the European Union level and how
growing concerns over the inadequacy of such protection led to the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra notes
See infta notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

147-76 and accompanying text.
177-90 and accompanying text.
191-306 and accompanying text.
198-230 and accompanying text.
231-47 and accompanying text.
248-306 and accompanying text.
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unsuccessful proposed EU accession to the European Convention on
Human Rights. Finally, this section presents the European Union's
latest attempt to address the EU fundamental rights protection
issue-the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
A. A Brief History of the European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice had modest beginnings in 1951 as an
oversight body charged with adjudicating matters arising within the
nascent European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC").25 Six years
later, after the Treaties of Rome" established the European
Economic Community2 7 ("EEC") and European Atomic Energy
Community2" ("EURATOM"), officials within the Member States
decided that one court, the ECJ, would rule over the three
international communities." A brief glance at the number of cases
brought under each treaty shows that the ECJ is most important to

25. See, e.g., Renaud Dehousse, The European Court of Justice: The Politics of
Judicial Integration 5 (1998): Dinan, supra note 3, at 2, 301-02. The Treaty of Paris
established both the ECJ and the ECSC in 1951. Dehousse, supra, at 5. Many
consider the ECSC, with six members (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands. and Luxembourg), the "first manifestation" of the European
Community. E.g., Dinan, supra note 3, at 2-3. Created in response to the need to
rehabilitate Germany and allay French security concerns following World War II,the
ECSC controlled the resources at the core of both nations' industrial economies and
war-making potential. Id. For its creators, the ECSC represented the beginning of a
"process that would culminate in a European federation transcending the nation
state." Id.at 3.
26. The Treaties of Rome include the Treaty Establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty") and The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community, both signed by the six members of the ECSC in 1957. See, e.g.,
Dehousse, supra note 25, at 5; Dinan, supra note 3, at 1; Neill Nugent, The
Government and Politics of the European Union 43-46 (4th ed. 1999).
27. Better known as the European Community, the supranational EEC focuses on
economic cooperation between its members. See, e.g., Dinan, supra note 3, at 9. The
EC Treaty states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between the states belonging to it.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340), art. 2
(1997) (Amsterdam Consolidated Version) [hereinafter EC Treatyj.
In its
subsequent articles, the EC treaty included fairly clear trade rules, with guiding
principles for agricultural and social policy. See, e.g., Nugent, supra note 26, at 42-43.
28. Together with the ECSC and EEC, EURATOM forms the first of "three
pillars" upon which the EU was founded in 1993-the other two pillars being the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters. E.g., Dinan, sitpra note 3,at 1-2.
29. Dehousse, supra note 25, at 5 ("1lIt was decided that a single court would deal
with legal disputes arising under all three Communities.").
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the EEC." Consequently, the ECJ derives much of its power from the
Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"). 1.The Birth of a Constitutional Court
The EC Treaty indicates that the EEC founders intended the ECJ
to hear cases brought by other Community organs and Member
States, and not by individuals.1 2 For example, Articles 226 and 227
allow the European Commission" and Member States to bring claims
against specific Member States for failure to comply with the EC
Treaty.34 Article 230 establishes the Court's jurisdiction in cases
brought against the Commission or the European CouncilP 5 by a
Member State, the Commission, the Council, or by specific individuals
who are the subject of a Council or Commission decision in which
they are named.3" Almost as an afterthought, Article 234 authorizes
30. Id. at 5-6. By 1995, the ECJ had made 4024 judgments regarding the EEC,
compared to 359 for the ECSC and 19 for EURATOM. Id.
31. See id.(noting that "the dominance of the EEC Treaty is in part attributable
to the purpose of' this treaty, which covers all the principal areas of economic
activity"): see also supra note 27. Traders bringing suits citing TEC provisions have
played a key role in the development of litigation before the ECJ. Dehousse. supra
note 25, at 6.
32. See EC Treaty arts. 221-34 ("The Court of Justice shall sit in plenary session
when a Member State or a Community institution that is a party to the proceedings so
requests.").
other bodies in the EU governmental
33. The European Commission, unlike tile
system, has no analogue within national governmental systems. Dinan, supra note 3,
at 205. The national governments of the Member States appoint the Commission's
EU's interests. Id. The Commission has the
members, who pledge to serve tile
exclusive right to initiate legislation in the first pillar, but, at the same time, retains
"IT1he
quasi-executive authority within the EU governmental structure. Id.
Commission epitomizes supranationalism and lies at the center of the EU system." Id.
34. EC Treaty arts. 226-27. These articles state:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty [and the latter fails to comply with an opinion
issued by the formerj ...Ithe Commission] may bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.... A Member State which considers that another Member
State has failed to Ifulfil an obligation under this Treaty may bring the matter
before the Court of Justice.
Id.
35. The European Council (not to be confused with the Council of Europe)
consists of each Member State's top political leaders and the Commission President,
assisted by the Member States' 'oreign ministers. Dinan. sopra note 3, at 237: Nugent,
supra note 26, at 177. The EEC institutionalized the Council in 1974. See Nugent.,
supra note 26, at 177-78. The European Council meets at least twice a year and
reports on the progress achieved by the EU, lending an intergovernmental aspect to
the otherwise supranational EU structure. See Dinan, supra note 3. at 238: Nugent,
supra note 26, at 178-79.
36. EC Treaty art. 230. Article 230 reads:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by tile
European Parliament and the Council, of acts of' the Council, of the
Commission and of the ECB ....It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction
in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission ....
Any natural or legal person may ... institute proceedings against a decision
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the Court to issue "preliminary rulings" on questions concerning
Community law that arise in the national courts of the Member

States.37
The EC Treaty does not explicitly grant individuals standing to
challenge breaches of Community law before the ECJ. 31 Without
access for individuals, the ECJ appears unsuitable to adjudicate
fundamental rights claims. Through innovative use of Article 234,
individuals have found ways to bring claims before the Court.3 9 By
removing a major obstacle to uniform fundamental rights protection
in the EU, Article 234 has strengthened Community law and the
ECJ's role as a rights protector.4
Article 234 permits lower national courts to seek guidance from the
ECJ in cases involving Community law, but obligates the highest
national courts to do so.4' Once a court requests a preliminary ruling,
the ECJ assesses the arguments presented, along with relevant case
law and treaty provisions, and issues a binding ruling which the

national court must apply.12 Preliminary rulings serve three major

functions: (1) they ensure that national courts make legally "correct"
decisions with respect to EC law, (2) they promote the uniform
interpretation and application of EC law in the Member States, and

addressed to that person or against a decision which ...
individual concern to the former.

is of direct and

Id.
37. See id. art. 234. Article 234 states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
a. the interpretation of this Treaty:
b. the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community
and of the ECB:
c. the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may. if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter
before the Court of Justice.
Id. EC Treaty Article 234 establishes an important connection between tile
ECJ and
tile
Member States' national courts. See id.
38. See generally EC Treaty arts. 226-34 (explaining the role and jurisdiction of
the ECJ).
39. See Dinan, snpra note 3,at 305 (describing Article 234 as a "powerful tool"
and a means for citizens to "ascertain tile
compatibility of national and Community
law"). A lower national court deliberating a case brought by an individual may
request -authoritative guidance" via a preliminary ruling from the ECJ when the
national court cannot resolve tile
dispute based on previous EC case law. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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(3) they provide valuable access to the ECJ for private individuals
who cannot directly appeal to the Court, either for lack of legal
standing or lack of funding. 3 The EC's proper legal and economic
functioning relies heavily on the preliminary ruling mechanism.4 4 By
creating ECJ review power over national courts, the preliminary
ruling procedure effectively made the ECJ a supreme court for the
European Union. 5
Legal scholars often classify the ECJ as a "constitutional court,"
comparable in function to the United States Supreme Court, because
it acts as a supreme court that ensures the uniform interpretation and
application of Community law.4" Although "constitutional court"
most accurately describes the ECJ, the Court cannot hear appeals of
national courts' decisions. 7 Despite this incongruence, some consider
the collective effect of ECJ rulings a constitutionalization of the EC's
The ECJ's broad interpretations of treaty
founding treaties."
provisions, particularly EC Treaty Article 234, suggest the Court's
As a
willingness to assert itself on the supranational stage.
constitutional court, the ECJ has great potential as a fundamental
rights champion.
2. EC Law and the Beginnings of a Federal/State Judicial Hierarchy
EC law has two main sources-"primary" and "secondary"
"Primary legislation" includes treaties and their
legislation."

43. Id.
44. See id. ("ITIhe preliminary rulings procedure is of fundamental importance to
the proper functioning of the legal and economic system established by the EEC
Treaty. It is in the framework of that procedure that basic principles of the
Community legal order ... have been developed." (citing Anthony Arnull, Reference
to the European Court, 15 Eur. L. Rev. 391 (1990))).
45. Dinan, supra note 3, at 305 ("The increasing rate of preliminary ruling
requests I'rom lower courts has enhanced the stature of the ECJ, effectively giving it
the power to review national law and thereby turning it into a supreme court.").
46. See Dehousse, supra note 25, at 35 ("It is ...incontestable that the court has
seen itself endowed with a constitutional task: to ensure the uniform interpretation of
the treaties.").
47. See id.
48. See Dinan, supra note 3, at 302 ("From the outset the ECJ has seen the
original treaties not simply as narrow international agreements but, because of the
member states' unique decision to share sovereignty, as the basis of a constitutional
framework for the EU.").
49. See Dehousse, supra note 25, at 34-35 (referring to Article 177 of the original
EC Treaty, which maps onto Article 234 of the amended EC Treaty)- Dinan, supra
note 3,at 301-03, 305-06 (noting the Court's use of EC Treaty Article 177 (now
Article 234)). "The Treaty of Rome evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding
upon sovereign states, into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially
enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private,
within the European Union." Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration:
Europe and Beyond 73 (1999).
50. E.g., Dinan, supra note 3,at 302: Nugent, supra note 26, at 260.
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subsequent amendments." "Secondary legislation" consists of laws
made in accordance with the treaties.5 2 EU law that does not require
any national measures in order for it to be binding has direct
applicability within the Member States."
The ECJ gradually has developed its power and influence with the
aim of promoting uniformity in Community law, thereby contributing
to further integration within the EC."4
Two doctrinal pillars
developed by the Court maintain uniformity within EC law: direct
effect and primacy."
The principle of direct effect holds that certain EC law provisions
either confer rights or impose obligations on individuals that national
courts must recognize and enforce." The ECJ first established the
direct effect of primary legislation in the 1963 Van Gend en Loos57
case. In its opinion, the Court declared that "any unconditionally
worded treaty provision, being 'self sufficient and legally complete,'
did not require further intervention at the national or Community
levels and therefore applied directly to individuals.""8 Beginning with
Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ incrementally expanded the scope of
direct effect in a series of judgments.59 In so doing, the Court
enhanced its ability to enforce EU law at the national level.6"
To ensure the value of direct effect in the enforcement of EU law,
the ECJ developed the principle of primacy. 6 This principle holds
that EU law supersedes national law, thereby establishing an informal
federal-state hierarchy between the Community organs and the

51. E.g., Dinan, supra note 3, at 302: Nugent, supra note 26, at 260-61.
52. E.g., Dinan, supra note 3, at 302; Nugent, supra note 26, at 260.
53. Nugent, supra note 26, at 260 ("EU law is directly applicable when there is no
need for national measures to be taken in order for the law to have binding force
within the member states."). This straightforward principle suggests a self-executing
nature to certain EU law.
54. See, e.g., Dehousse, supra note 25, at 34-35 (concluding that the Court
principally must "ensure the uniform interpretation of the treaties"); Dinan, supra
note 3, at 301-03 (noting that the ECJ's case law maintained the momentum for
further integration); Nugent, supra note 26, at 257 (stating the Court's "duty to ensure
that EU law is interpreted and applied correctly").
55. Nugent, supra note 26, at 260-61.
56. See Dinan, supra note 3, at 303 (citing Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, 1963 E.C.R. 3).
57. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, 1963 E.C.R. 3
(involving a Dutch importer who wanted to invoke directly the EC Treaty against the
Dutch government, which was attempting to tax certain imports).
58. See Dinan, supra note 3, at 303 (internal citation omitted).
59. Nugent, supra note 26, at 261 (noting that the ECJ "has gradually
strengthened and extended the scope of direct effect so that it now applies to most
secondary legislation except when discretion is explicitly granted to the addressee").
60. See Dinan, supra note 3, at 303-04; Nugent, supra note 26, at 260-61.
61. Dinan, supra note 3, at 304 ("The principle of direct effect would have had
little impact if Community law did not supersede national law."); Nugent, supra note
26, at 261 ("Clearly the principle is vital if the EU is to function properly.").
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Member States. 2
Although the EC Treaty makes no explicit
reference to primacy, the Court has actively sought to establish the
supremacy of EC law almost from the outset. 3 Just one year after
Van Gend en Loos, in Costa v. ENEL, 4 the Court declared that in
creating a community like the EC, with legitimate power granted by
willing limitation and transfer of sovereignty from the Member States
to the community, the Member States have created a body of law
binding upon "both their nationals and themselves.16 5 National
legislation could not override Community law without undermining
the EC's legal basis.'16 In 1978, the Court expanded Community law
primacy in Simmenthal S.p.A. v. Commission," ruling that national
courts must apply Community law in its entirety and eliminate any
national laws that conflict with Community law.
With the landmark decisions in Van Gend en Loos, Costa, and
Simmenthal, and the subsequent establishment of the principles of
direct effect and primacy, the ECJ took national courts by surprise."
This prompted a reaction from the national courts, which challenged
the legitimacy of the ECJ. 71 The Court ultimately responded by
expanding significantly the scope of its fundamental rights
jurisprudence.
3. Compliance and Legitimacy Surrounding ECJ Rulings
The ECJ's capability as a fundamental rights guardian hinges on
how much the Court's decisions actually affect the EC Member States.
National courts within the Member States must consistently comply
with, accept, and apply the Court's decisions for them to have any real

62. See, e.g., Dehousse, supra note 25, at 41 ("It was thus clear that Community
law ... required that incompatible national legislation be set aside."); Dinan, supra
note 3, at 304 ("IT]he ECJ had no hesitation in asserting the supremacy of
Community law over national law."): Nugent, supra note 26, at 261 ("National
courts ... must apply EU law in any conflict, even if the domestic law is part of the
national constitution.").
63. See, e.g., Dehousse, supra note 25, at 41 (noting that the EC Treaty is "silent
on this point"): Dinan, supra note 3, at 30t4 (dubbing the EC Treaty "equivocal on the
issue").
64. Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585. 594 (holding that Community law could not be
overridden by domestic measures without threatening the attainment of the
objectives of the EC Treaty).
65. Id. at 593.
66. See id. at 592-94.
67. Case 92/78, 1979 E.C.R. 777.
68. See Dinan, supra note 3, at 304 ("[Elvery national court must ... apply
Community law in its entirety ... and must accordingly set aside any provisions of
national law which may conflict with it." (citing Case 92/78, Simmenthal v.
Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 777)).
69. Dinan, supra note 3, at 304.
70. Id. ("Some national courts reacted strongly against what they saw as the
encroachment of a new legal order.").

2003]

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION

2833

influence within the EU.71 The Court must also derive legitimacy
from the support of the Member States and their populations, even in
the face of disagreement with its decisions.72 Without compliance and
legitimacy, the Court's decisions constitute mere lip service and
provide no real protection to individuals.73
From the outset, the ECJ has enjoyed a large degree of legitimacy
and compliance by the Member States.7 4 The Court'should expect
such compliance, because each Member State became a willing
participant in the EU by relinquishing some sovereignty.7 5 Member
States accepted the Court's competence as obligatory and exclusivejoining members must respect its authority.76 Without an effectively
supreme EC law, common policies would "not in practice exist" and
national interests would continually undermine the entire rationale
behind the EC's formation.7 7 The Court famously explained the
binding legal effects of the EC in the Costa v.ENEL judgment:
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity
of representation on the international plane and, more particularly,
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer
of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and
have thus created
a body of law which binds both their nationals and
78
themselves.

On the whole, the Member States and their courts have bowed to
the ECJ's requirements, and have accepted the Court's
jurisprudence. 79 A broad consensus among the Member States
regarding the values the ECJ sought to promote led to this early
compliance with ECJ rulings. "' This consensus, coupled with the
71. See Dinan, supra note 3, at 305, 309-10 see also James L. Gibson & Gregory
A. Caldeira. The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: Compliance,
Support, and the European Court of Justice, 39 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 459, 461 (1995).
72. See Dinan, supra note 3,at 305: Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 71, at 461.
73. See Dinan, supra note 3, at 304-05.
74. Dehousse, supra note 25, at 118 (noting that "Itihe ECJ's case law edifice was
given a positive-even enthusiastic-welcome, and, in most cases, its judgments have
been faithfully applied"). But cf Gibson & Caldeira. supra note 71, at 464 (pointing
to a decline in legitimacy and compliance during the 1980s).
75. Nugent, supra note 26, at 242 ("[The EU] is an organisation in which states
have voluntarily surrendered their right, across a broad range of important sectors, to
be independent in the determination and application of public policy.").
76. EC Treaty art. 292 (forbidding Member States from seeking any other venue
for the resolution of EC Treaty-related conflicts).
77. Nugent, supra note 26, at 243 (noting that the effectiveness of common
policies hinges on common laws capable of uniform interpretation in all joining
states).
78. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593.
79. Dehousse, supra note 25, at 120.
80. See id. at 121-22 (referring to the strong pro-integration sentiment of the late
1980s and early 1990s, which, in turn, led to a positive reception of the pro-integration
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relatively obscure character of EU law at the time, ensured that the
Court met little systematic resistance to its activities.Y1
In addition to widespread compliance with its decisions, the ECJ
enjoys a social legitimacy as a result of decisions that, by improving
upon the level of rights protection afforded to individuals within the
EU, produce broad incentives for compliance by national institutions
and individuals. 2 Through its judgments in response to preliminary
reference requests, the ECJ has enhanced individual rights protection
in areas where Community law affords better protection than the
national law of some Member States, such as equal pay for women. 3
By subjecting Member States' actions that affect fundamental rights
protection to judicial review under EU standards, Article 234 has
become a vital tool for fundamental rights improvement. 4 The social
legitimacy resulting from the Court's image as a valuable ally to the
individual against the Member States' national governments
substantially enhances the ECJ's ability to promote fundamental
rights within the European Union." The EU must establish its ability
to guarantee a minimum fundamental rights protection standard that
is palatable to the Member States' national courts. Otherwise,
pressure from the Member States will force the ECJ to take a
conservative approach to the adjudication of fundamental rights
claims that will limit its effectiveness as a fundamental rights
protector."
B. The Fundamental Rights Jurisprudenceof the ECJ Priorto the Nice
Charter
The EC's original treaty framework does not mention "human
rights." 7 Unable to find explicit textual support for its mission, the
ECJ developed its fundamental rights jurisprudence without the
benefit or guidance of express treaty provisions mandating it to do

rulings of the ECJ).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 145 ("The very broad interpretation of the concept of direct effect
sustained by the ECJ has in effect conferred on private persons a substantial number
of individual rights, which the preliminary reference procedure has allowed them to
effectively enjoy.").
83. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
84. See Dehousse, supra note 25, at 146 (noting that approximately eighty-five
percent of Article 234 cases concern individuals in dispute with a public body).
85. See id. (suggesting that the use of Article 234 has allowed the Court to appear
as a "useful ally in the struggle against bureaucracy which characterizes modern
societies").
86. See id. at 176 (describing the increasingly conservative approach taken by the
ECJ resulting from a desire to avoid unnecessary confrontations with the national
courts in the face of growing criticism from sources at the national level).
87. See Dinan, supra note 3. at 302. Dinan suggests, however, that "Ifiundamental
human rights ...underpin EC law." Id.
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so." The Court started slowly, but eventually built a substantial body
of non-binding human rights law that ultimately prompted the EU to
propose codification of its own list of fundamental rights. 9
1. The Genesis of Fundamental Rights Cases in Luxembourg
The ECJ initially hesitated to expand its jurisdiction beyond the
field of economic activity within the Community,"' and the EC Treaty
Slowly, the Court's
drafters did not foresee such an expansion."
jurisprudence extended to the area of workers' rights, particularly
women's rights in the workplace. 2 The EC Treaty does, however,
explicitly support protecting women's rights, 3 making the Court's
behavior consistent with the EC's policy of intervening only where a
clear link to creating a common market exists.94 The ECJ's attention
to individual rights during this period laid a critical foundation for
future Community initiatives in the realm of fundamental human
rights. 5

88. Weiler, supra note 8,at 567. Weiler notes that:
[I]n the absence of a written Bill of' Rights in the Treaties and in the
presence of an apparent freedom to the Community legislature to disregard
individual rights in Community legislation, the European Court of Justice, in
an exercise of bold judicial interpretivism, and reversing an earlier case-law,
created an unwritten higher law of fundamental human rights, culled from
the Constitutional traditions of the Member States and international
agreements such as the European Convention on Human Rights.
Id.
89. See Rainer Arnold, A Fundamental Rights Charterfor the European Union, 15
Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 43, 44-46 (2000-2001) (noting that the Charter corresponds to
the evolution of Community law by "taking over particular judge-made fundamental
rights developed by the [ECJ]").
90. Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty 123 (David O'Keeffe & Patrick M.
Twomey eds., 1994) ("In the absence of a catalogue of rights in the Treaty of Rome
on which to base its jurisprudence, the Court of Justice initially proved reluctant to
protect fundamental rights other than those explicit in the text of the [EC Treaty].").
91. See Nugent, supra note 26, at 259.
92. liana Ostner & Jane Lewis, Gender and the Evolution of European Social
Policies, in European Social Policy 159, 159 (Stephen Liebfried & Paul Pierson eds.,
1995) ("The European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have
had much success in promoting, monitoring, and interpreting the rights of working
women, forcing major revisions of national practice.").
93. EC Treaty art. 141 (calling for the equal treatment of women).
94. Ostner & Lewis, supra note 92, at 162 (noting that "[firom 1957-1972, the EC
intervened in social policy only when the link to creating a common market was
obvious").
95. See id. at 162. Between 1975 and 1986, the Council of Ministers passed five
equality directives in the areas of equal pay and equal treatment. Id. By the late
1980s, the ECJ's interpretations of article 119 (now articles 141-42), Commission
sponsored directives to strengthen and extend article 119, and subsequent rulings
regarding the meanings of the directives, yielded a substantial body of gender-related
politics. Id. "The Commission and the ECJ have exploited successfully the principle
of equal pay and of equal treatment, forcing a number of states to give up many
discriminatory practices." Id. at 160.
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The Court began to realize the EC's growing capacity to influence
fundamental rights protection, and first addressed the issue in Stauder
v. City of Ulm.' National courts, particularly those in Germany and
Italy, threatened to question the ECJ's legitimacy 9without
a full,
7
codified Community recognition of fundamental rights.
The
ECJ
responded
in
its
ruling
in
Internationale
Handelsgeselschaft" by asserting that "the validity of a Community
measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by
allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as
formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a
national constitutional structure. '"" The ECJ attempted to address
any concern this decision raised by insisting that fundamental rights
protection is a principal concern of the European Community.'0
Rather than enforce national law, the ECJ would seek "analogous
guarantees" particular to Community law. "" This bold assertion of
primacy in the face of incompatibility with local fundamental rights
protection standards concerned the national courts. 12 Without any
bill of rights at the Community level, Member States found it difficult
to ascertain the legal basis1 3 for the Court's resolve to ensure
fundamental rights protection.'
The ECJ attempted in its 1974 decision, Nold v. Coninission,1 4 to
define more precisely the criteria the Court would apply in its
fundamental rights jurisprudence."" In the Nold ruling, the ECJ held
that Community law bound the Court to look to the common
traditions of the Member States and the ECHR for inspiration in
cases involving fundamental rights."l ' Taken together with the specific
96. Case 29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419. 425 (holding that human rights considerations
inhere in EC law).
97. See Dehousse, supra note 25, at 62-63 (noting the risk before 1970 that
national courts would refuse to apply Community provisions at odds with national
human rights standards). Germany and Italy posed particular threats because of their
heightened sensitivity to human rights in the wake of World War II. Id. at 63.
98. Case 11/70, Internationale Hlandelsgesellschaft GmbH v. Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelle for Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (issuing a preliminary
ruling to the German administrative court concerning the validity of a Community
regulation regarding import and export licenses for cereal products).
99. Id.at 1134.
100. See id. (holding that "respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of
the general principles of [Communityl law").
101. See id.: Dehousse, supra note 25, at 64 (citing Internationalc
Handelsgesellschaft).
102. See Dehousse, supra note 25, at 64.
103. See id. The national courts, particularly those of Germany and Italy. "saw in
this vagueness a degree of uncertainty so great as to cast doubts on the efficacy of

human rights protection at Community level." 1d.
104. Case 4/73, 1974 E.C.R. 491 (stating that the protection of fundamental rights
not only iscompatible with economic integration, but isnecessary to such aproject).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 507: see also Dehousse, supra note 25, at 64 (noting that the Court at
this stage envisaged its later use of the ECHR as a non-binding fundamental rights
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analogous guarantees in Community law, the inspiration drawn from
the Member States provides the basis for an autonomous fundamental
rights protection standard encompassed by EC law." 7
Just two weeks after the Nold decision, the most notorious
challenge to ECJ authority came from the German Constitutional
Court in the Solange I' case.' 9 In a decision directly challenging the
principle of supremacy, Germany's highest court declared that until
the EC adopted a catalogue of basic rights, in accordance with
German Basic Law and adopted by Germany's parliament, the
German Court reserved the right to review EC law for any
incongruence. " "
Heeding the underlying concern that prompted the challenge in
Solange I, the ECJ proceeded cautiously but productively with the
development of its fundamental rights jurisprudence.'" Eventually,
the ECJ established a standard sufficient to allay the German
Constitutional Court's fears, and the German Court renounced
12 its
review power over the application of Community secondary law.'
The judicial dialogue between the ECJ and the German national
courts illustrates how the ECJ's expansion of its fundamental rights
jurisprudence came in direct response to challenges to direct effect
and primacy by the Member States' national courts. 13 Rather than
force the ECJ to continue to tiptoe around the area of fundamental
rights protection, risking future challenges by national courts of
Community law supremacy,'" the EU should seek a codified set of
fundamental rights, directly enforceable before the ECJ.
2. EC Accession to the ECHR-Round 1
The search for a set of codified fundamental rights for the
European Union should begin with the ECHR. Each of the Member
standard from which to draw inspiration).
107. See Nold, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 507-08; Dehousse, supra note 25, at 64.
108. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 2 BVerfGE 52/71 (1974) Ihereinafter
Solange 11.
109. See Dehousse, supra note 25. at 64-65 (stating that the there could be no more
direct a threat to the ECJ's authority).
110. See Solange 1,2 BVerfGE 52/71.
111. Dehousse, supra note 25, at 65-66 (describing the ECJ's response to Solange I
with a "cautious line" of cases, exemplified by Cinthque v. FdrationNationale des
Cinimas Franqais, Joined Cases 60 & 61/84, 1985 E.C.R. 2605, and the Court's
subsequent move to a less cautious attitude, while retaining great deference to the
Member States' legal orders).
112. See Wtinsche Handelsgesellschaft. 2 BVerfGE 197/83 (1986) (deeming it no
longer necessary for the German Constitutional Court to control the application of
EC secondary law so long as the ECJ ensured the effective protection of fundamental
human rights); Dehousse, supra note 25, at 66. The German Court referred to
Wiinsche as Solange II. Dehousse, supra note 25, at 66.
113. See Dehousse, supra note 25, at 64-66.
114. See id. at 64-69.
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States has already acceded to the Convention,'" making its list of
protected rights an obvious starting point in the quest for universal
rights protection within the EU. Even the ECJ itself, in the Nold
decision, recognized the potential inspiration to be drawn from
agreements such as the ECHR. l ' Unfortunately, difficulty lies in the
resolution of the relationship between the EC and the ECHR.
Almost immediately after the ECJ charged itself with fundamental
rights protection within the European Community, the relationship
between the EC and the ECHR came to the forefront in several
cases-brought before both the ECJ and the European Commission
of Human Rights." 7 In response to the Nold decision, individuals
within the Member States recognized the possibility of applying the
ECHR at the Community level, and attempted to bring cases before
the European Commission on Human Rights against both EC organs
and Member States applying EC-mandated legislation.'"
The
Commission rejected these cases on the grounds that the ECHR's
jurisdiction did not extend to the EC, which had. not signed the
Convention.'"
Rulings by the Commission blocking claims brought against the EC
caused continued concern within the Member States, which already
viewed fundamental rights protection on the EC level with
skepticism. z Eventually, this concern prompted some academics and
EC officials to propose EC accession to the ECHR. 2 ' Accession to
the ECHR would resolve the lack of jurisdiction in cases involving
Community organs, thereby assuring that the minimum ECHR
standards would apply at the Community level as well as the national
level.22
Accession to the ECHR would mean more than merely an
acceptance of the fundamental catalogue of rights featured by the
Convention.'2 3 The ECHR requires that a petitioner exhaust all
115. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
116. See Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 507; Philip Raworth,
Introduction to the Legal System of the European Union 216 (2001).
117. Peter Wessman, 7 The Protection of Human Rights in European Community
Law 7 (1992) (thesis, Instituet flr Europeisk R~itt vid Stockholms universitet).
Protocol 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms eliminated the need to petition the Commission. See supra note 10. Now
petitioners can bring claims directly before the European Court of Human Rights. See
supra note 10.
118. See Wessman, supra note 117, at 7. The ECJ refused to hear some of these
cases, making the Commission the only recourse available to those parties seeking
justice. Id.
119. Lawson, supra note 7, at 230.
120. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
121. See Wessman, supra note 117, at 7; Lawson, supra note 7, at 219 (noting
Professor Henry Schermers's advocacy of Community accession to the ECHR in
1978, prior to the EC Commission's memorandum suggesting the same action).
122. Lawson, supra note 7, at 233.
123. Wessman, supra note 117, at 7.
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domestic remedies prior to filing a complaint under the Convention's
mechanism, meaning individual petitions before the Commission
would come in the wake of ECJ rulings, ultimately granting the
European Court of Human Rights judicial review over the ECJ.'24
Consequently, in a 1996 opinion,'2 5 the ECJ blocked the possibility
of Community membership in the ECHR when it held that the EU's
founding Treaties did not authorize the Commission to negotiate
agreements in the realm of human rights itself-asserting, ironically,
that the Treaties limited the EU's competence to the economic
stage.' 26 In order to quell any fear that the Community lacked an
obligation to respect fundamental rights norms embodied by the
ECHR, officials pointed to Article 6 of the Maastricht Treaty,'2 7 which
essentially codified the approach of the ECJ in the Nold'2 z decision,
thereby providing that the EU would respect fundamental rights
norms as found within the ECHR and the constitutions of the
Member States. 2 9 By acknowledging the rights found within the
ECHR without allowing the EC to sign the Convention, the ECJ
appeased those concerned that fundamental rights protection at the
Community level would fail to meet the minimum standards in the
ECHR without making itself subservient to the Strasbourg Court. 3"
124. See ECHR, supra note 10, art. 35(1) ("The [Strasbourg] Court may only deal
with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted."); Lammy Betten &
Nicholas Grief, EU Law and Human Rights 117 (1998).
125. Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 1787-89
(denying that the Community has competence to accede to the ECHR). The Court
acknowledged the importance of respecting human rights, but found that accession to
the ECHR would entail such substantial modifications to the Community's system of
rights protection as to necessitate treaty amendment. Betten & Grief, supra note 124,
at 113.
126. See Giorgio Sacerdoti, The European Charter of FundamentalRights: From a
Nation-State Europe to a Citizens' Europe, 8 Colum. J. Eur. L. 37, 38-39 (2002). The
ECJ revealed its true fear when it declared that accession was "incompatible with its
role as supreme guarantor of the Community's legality to attribute jurisdiction to the
Strasbourg court, a jurisdiction which might conflict with the ECJ's competence."Id.
at 40 (citing Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759).
127. Treaty on European Union, Oct. 1, 1997, O.J. (C 340) (1997) (as amended by
the
Treaty
of
Amsterdam),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/treaties/dat/eu constreaty-en.pdf. Article 6 reads:
1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law.
id.
128. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
129. See Sacerdoti, supra note 126, at 40.
130. See id.
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This clever solution maintained the legal order that had evolved
within the Community, but did little to resolve the vagueness that
plagued the ECJ's authority in the area of fundamental rights-and it
left two international courts poised for future conflict.13
C. A Bill of Rights for the European Union
Although the ECJ's fundamental rights jurisprudence continued to
grow throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the European
Commission in 1998 formed a committee to study the possibility of
formally recognizing fundamental rights at the Community level.' 32 In
June 1999, the European Council in Cologne decided to draft a
charter covering fundamental rights in the EU.'33 Just over a year
later, at the December 2000 intergovernmental conference in Nice,
the European Council proclaimed the European Union Fundamental
Rights Charter.'34
The Council intended the Charter to reiterate the importance of
fundamental rights in the EU by expressing these rights in a more
visible format.'35 Two principal underlying motivations for the
expression of fundamental rights in a highly visible charter, such as
that proposed in Nice, surfaced: the aspirational purpose of bringing
fundamental rights to the forefront of Community policy,"' and the
practical purpose of protecting the ECJ's supremacy within the EU
legal order.'3 7
131. See id.
132. See id. at 41.
133. See id. The Charter would cover:
the rights of liberty and equality, the fundamental procedural rights
guaranteed by the ECHR and resulting from the common constitutional
traditions ... the fundamental rights of IEU] citizens ... [as well as] the
economic and social rights provided for in the European Social Charter...
and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers.
Id.
134. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 44-45.
135. See Thomas von Danwitz, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union Between Political Symbolism and Legal Realistm, 29 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y
289, 291-92 (2001).
136. See, e.g., id. (suggesting that the Charter's recognition of the value of
fundamental rights to the citizens of the EU promises to contribute to the core of a
future European identity); Olivier de Schutter, The Questions to be DecidedPrttecting Fundamental Rights, an Issue in the Convention on the Future of Europe,
para. 2, at http://europa.eu.int/commj ustice-home/unit/charte/en/print/questions.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2003) (noting that, in the presence of the new Charter,
fundamental rights should give direction to the building process within the EU). A
detailed discussion about the aspirational underpinnings of the Nice Charter is
beyond the scope of this Note.
137. See Danwitz, supra note 135, at 289, 293 (noting that the idea to adopt a
charter of fundamental rights for the EU comes in direct response to demands
originating in the early 1970s from national courts, governments and community
institutions); see also supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
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Adopting a charter of fundamental rights would signify to the ECJ,
and to the rest of the world, the importance the EU places on the
protection of human rights.13' This recognition could, and hopefully
would, indirectly lead to "an enhanced level of fundamental rights
protection in the EU" by refocusing
the attention of Community
1
institutions, particularly the ECJ. 31
While making fundamental rights a priority in future EU
policymaking is an admirable goal, the Nice Charter's more
immediate value comes from the second underlying motivation: the
Charter's ability to protect the supremacy of EU law from the
continued allegation that rights protection at the EU level is subpar. 4 " The continued legitimacy of the Community legal order, along
with the corollary EU defense against the criticism that it cannot
sufficiently guarantee the protection of its citizens' fundamental
rights, constitutes a necessary precondition for the realization of
enhanced fundamental rights protection within the EU.14' Rather
than look to the Charter for express new solutions writ large in the
realm of fundamental rights, one must look first at its ability to resolve
the claims of inadequate rights protection at the Community level-in
particular, the Charter's ability to resolve the problem of divergent
ECHR interpretations by the ECJ and the European Court of Human
Rights.'42
II. Too MANY COURTS SPOIL THE JUDGMENT

It seems logical that the ECJ should retain its supremacy in the
realm of EC law, while the ECHR should continue to bind the
Member States. For the same reasons that Member States initially
considered the ECJ unsuited to adjudicate in the area of human
rights, 3 one will find the European Commission and the European
Court of Human Rights equally, if not more, unsuited to adjudicate in
the predominantly economic arena of Community law. 44 A very real
138. See Danwitz, supra note 135, at 294-95 ("By convincing the ECJ of the overall
importance of the protection of fundamental rights it can lead the ECJ to accept that
this is the principal mission it has to accomplish."); see also Schutter, supra note 136.
139. Danwitz. supra note 135, at 295.
140. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 46-47 (noting that the Charter represents an
"updated standard" in the continuous development of the EU's constitutional law).
141. See supra Part I.A.3: supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
142. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 47 (noting "there is no need nor any possibility
for the adoption of new concepts," but that "It he Charter cannot be contrary to the
tradition of the autonomous EC legal order"); see also infra Part 11.
143. See supra notes 97, 102-03, 108-10 and accompanying text.
144. See Mark W. Janis, Fashioning a Mechanism for Judicial Cooperation on
European Human Rights Law Among Europe's Regional Courts, in 3 The Dynamics
of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe 211, 216 (Rick Lawson & Matthijs de
Blois eds., 1994) (suggesting that the ECHR, representing more than twice as many
nations as the EU, may not be the proper arbiter in cases involving EU law and
policy).
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problem arises, though, when one considers the well-accepted EU
legal doctrines of direct effect 5 and primacy.4
A. Problems with the Current Two-Court System for Human Rights in
Europe

Under the current systems, a situation could arise in which an ECJ
opinion at variance with Strasbourg case law would nevertheless
obligate a national court to implement a law in violation of the
ECHR-thereby causing a Member State to derogate from its
responsibilities under the Convention. 47
Such an exercise of
conflicting jurisdiction would damage the legitimacy of one4 or both
courts and hinder their ability to protect fundamental rights. 1
Conflicting jurisdiction becomes practically relevant when
considering the ECJ's role as a political integrating factor within the
EU.'4 ' The political nature of the ECJ causes a problem due to the
paradoxical nature of fundamental rights protection. 5 " On one hand,
fundamental rights protection has an integrating value, because the
rights themselves give a sense of identity to a society and its
members.'
As such, the development of fundamental rights
protection is a critical integrating tool for the ECJ. On the other
hand, fundamental rights protection often aims to shield the
individual from public authority.'52 Taken as a whole, fundamental
rights protection standards within a given society seek to balance
protecting the individual with maintaining the identity and values
145. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
147. See Lawson, supra note 7, at 233. "[T]he ECJ considers itself by no means
obliged to follow the case-law of the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights." Id. at 228. Although the ECJ, by its own jurisprudence, has charged itself
with the interpretation of the ECHR, which expressly charges the Strasbourg Court
with the same task, there is no guarantee of similar interpretations by the two courts.
See Janis, supra note 144, at 213. Although a gross divergence has not yet occurred
between the jurisprudences of the two courts, it remains a realistic possibility. See
generally Lawson, supra note 7.
148. See Lawson, supra note 7, at 228-29.
149. Scholars have widely recognized the ECJ as a principal driving force behind
integration within the EU since the 1980s. See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley
Hoffmann, Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s, in The New European
Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change 1, 1 (Robert 0. Keohane &
Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1991) (noting the EC's extensive role in limiting national
autonomy and pushing Community-building acts); Mattli, supra note 49, at 73-74
(describing the Article 234 preliminary ruling procedure as a driving force for
integration); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 Am. J. Int'l L. 205, 233 (1993) (attributing the
"constitutionalization" of the EC Treaty to the ECJ alone). A detailed discussion of
the Court's integrating role is beyond the scope of this Note.
150. See Weiler, supra note 8, at 569.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 569-70. Much of the ECHR focuses on such protection for the
individual. See generally ECHR, supra note 10, arts. 1-17.
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common to the society.' 53 Given the active, and arguably political,
integrating role the ECJ has played in the EU, one may logically fear
a reluctance on the part of the Court to strike down legislation
important to the5 4Community's integrated workings in the name of
individual rights.1
One could argue that conflict between the Luxembourg and
Strasbourg Courts presents only theoretical problems, or, at least,
only marginal practical problems. After all, the ECHR defines only
minimum standards, leaving national (or supranational) authorities
free to set higher protection levels, and Community law limits the
ECJ's competence to national legislation made pursuant to EU law.'55
Still, any ECJ failure to guarantee the minimum standards established
by the ECHR would leave no remedy available to EU citizens.'5 6 The
continued exercise of overlapping jurisdiction by the ECJ and the
European Court of Human Rights will result in numerous divergent
ECHR interpretations that could damage the authority of both
courts.57

One example of the divergent interpretations problem surfaced in a
pair of cases brought before the ECJ and the ECHR that resulted in
opposing interpretations of ECHR Article 8.15 In 1989, the ECJ ruled
in Hoechst AG v. Commission' that ECHR Article 8 did not apply to
companies. 6"
Three years later, in Niemietz v. Germany,6 ' the
European Court of Human Rights held that Article 8 might apply to
certain business premises or activities.'62 These incompatible Article 8
153. See Weiler, supra note 8, at 569-70.
154. See id. at 570. The ECJ has "a clear tendency to approach cases from a
common market point of view." Lawson, supra note 7, at 251 (pointing out that the
ECJ did not entertain allegations of fundamental rights violations in CinWthque,
Joined Cases 60 & 61/84, 1985 E.C.R. 2605, Demirel, Case 12/86, 1987 E.C.R. 3719,
and Grogan, Case C-159/90, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685).
155. Lawson, supra note 7, at 230.
156. 1d. at 230-31.
157. Id. at 250 ("Any exercise of overlappingjurisdiction by the [ECHR] and by the
[ECJ] could give rise to confitsion and conflict." (quoting Case 118/75, Watson &
Belmann, 1976 E.C.R. 1207)).
158. See id. at 239-47. ECHR Article 8 provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
ECHR, supra note 10, art. 8.
159. Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, 1989 E.C.R. 2859.
160. Id. at 2924 (validating an EC search of a business premises without a court
order from the ECJ).
161. App. No. 13710/88,16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1992).
162. Id. at 112 ("[T]o interpret the words 'private life' and 'home'as including
certain professional or business activities or premises would be consonant with the
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interpretations merited particular concern because the EC
Commission already enjoyed wide powers in competition law.'63
A second example of divergent ECHR interpretations arose in a
more complex series of cases dealing with a person's right to respect
for her name. The case before the ECJ, Konstantinidis v. Stadt
Altensteig-Standesanit,64 involved a Greek man who felt his name had
been incorrectly transliterated by the German government.'
The
Advocate General'1 6 argued that a broad interpretation of ECHR
Article 867 should recognize an individual right to prevent "unjustified
interference" with one's name. 6 ' In its judgment, however, the ECJ
completely ignored the Article 8 human rights aspect of the case,
basing its decision on the potential economic impact on Mr.
Konstantinidis. 6 9
By contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has addressed
the human rights issues inherent in cases involving the right to a name,
and has expanded its Article 8 interpretation to extend protection to
individuals who change their names. 7 In several cases raised by
transsexuals wishing to change their names to reflect their new sexual
identities, the Strasbourg Court recognized that states may violate
Article 8 when they deny a person the right to change her nameprovided that such a denial brings significant inconvenience to the
individual. 7 ' Later cases went further, reading a right to develop and
essential object and purpose of Article 8. namely to protect the individual against
arbitrary interference by the public authorities.").
163. See Lawson, supra note 7, at 245 (noting that the "broader implications" of
Hoechst "should not be overlooked").
164. Case C-168/91, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1191 (holding that if' a stale obliges a Greek
national to use a transliterated spelling of her name for business purposes, the
pronunciation of that name cannot be distorted to the extent of causing confusion of
identity for that individual's potential clients).
165. See id. Christos Konstantinidis was registered as "Christos Konstadinidis"
when he married a German national. Id. at 1193. He applied to have the spelling
corrected, at which time the German government employed a professional to
transliterate the name. Id. The end result was even worse, spelled "Hr~stos
Kanstantinid~s." See id. The German court felt that forcing Mr. Konstantinidis to
spell his name in a distorted fashion could be an infringement of his rights under
Community law. See Lawson, supra note 7, at 247.
166. The nine Advocates General are responsible for "mak[ing], in open court,
reasoned submissions on cases brought before the Court of Justice, in order to assist
the Court." EC Treaty art. 222. The Member States appoint the Advocates General,
who "do not participate in the Court's deliberations." Dehousse, supra note 25, at 9.
167. For the text of Article 8, see supra note 158.
168. Lawson, supra note 7, at 248.
169. See Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig-Standesanit, 1993
E.C.R. [-1191 see also Lawson, supra note 7, at 248.
170. See Lawson, supra note 7, at 248-50.
171. See Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1986)
(acknowledging a possible Article 8 violation arising from the right to a name, but
denying that such a violation occurred in the present case): B. v. France, App. No.
13343/87, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1992) (finding that the inconveniences suffered by B.
in her everyday life constituted a violation of Article 8).
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fulfill one's personality, which included the right to a name-a right
deemed necessary to forming one's identity. 7 2 Although all of these
cases came prior to the judgment in Konstantinidis, the ECJ failed to
consider the cases in its deliberations. 73
In the first example, the ECJ and Strasbourg Court interpreted
ECHR Article 8 with different results. 7 4 The second example showed
how divergent interpretations can arise through the ostensibly
different foci of the Courts-economy for the ECJ and individual
rights for the Strasbourg Court. 7 5 The legitimacy of both courts rests
on the resolution of the divergent interpretations problem.'7 6
B. PossibleSolutions
In order to preserve the integrity of the two international judicial
orders, Europe must resolve the conflict and confusion resulting from
the courts' overlapping jurisdictions."'7 More importantly, a solution
would lead to better overall rights protection for individuals within
the European Union. Two solutions would completely eliminate
overlapping jurisdiction: (1) reexamining EU accession to the ECHR,
making the Strasbourg Court supreme in the realm of fundamental
rights, 7 ' and (2) creating a link between the two courts in order to
eliminate divergent rulings. 9

172. See Burghartz v. Switzerland, App. No. 16213/90, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 101
(1994) (Commission report) (finding that ECHR Article 8 ensures a sphere of privacy
in which everyone may freely develop her personality).
173. See Lawson, supra note 7, at 247-50, 249 n.89.
174. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
176. See Janis, supra note 144, at 213.
177. Some say that such a resolution is more important to the ECHR. Weiler, supra
note 8, at 619-20 ("Indeed, more than the Community needs for its internal reasons to
accede to the ECHR, the ECHR needs Community accession; for without accession
there is the danger that the focal point of Human Rights jurisprudence would shift
from Strasbourg to Luxembourg."). This suggests the potential impact of the ECJ not
only on the Member States, but on the entire Council of Europe.
The neat arrangement which the ECHR may be said to represent can only
work in relation to a core which gives expression to those "rights", or to
those "levels of protection", which are said to be universal, transcending any
legitimate cultural or political difference among different societies in, at
least, the universe of Europe.
Joseph H.H. Weiler, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards
and Values in the Protection of Hunian Rights, in The European Union and Human
Rights 51,53-54 (Nanette A. Neuwahl & Allan Rosas eds., 1995).
178. See Schutter, supra note 136, § II.
179. See Janis, supra note 144, at 213. These two solutions seem to be the only
options that would eradicate the problem. This Note proposes a third solution that
does not eliminate the overlap in jurisdiction-it aims to limit the divergence in the
face of overlapping jurisdiction. See infra Parts ll.B.3, III.B-C.
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1. EU Accession to the ECHR- Round 2
One way to approach the two-court problem is to amend the EU
Treaties to permit Community accession to the ECHR ("Accession
Approach"). The EU would reap important legal and political
benefits by acceding to the ECHR."8 " Procedurally, EU accession to
the Convention would eliminate the possibility of conflicting
fundamental rights law interpretations.' Politically, accession would
strengthen the EU's democratic legitimacy by better defining the
EU's relationship to its citizens and reaffirming its commitment to the
protection of its citizens' rights. 1 2 The Accession Approach has failed
once, and to succeed would require a fundamental shift in the ECJ's
approach
to interpreting Community law-a shift that may never
13
occur. 8

2. Creating a Link Between the Two Courts
Another approach to the problem of overlapping jurisdiction is to
create a method of cooperation between the ECJ and the Strasbourg
Court by amending both the EU Treaties and the ECHR, so that
neither court is subordinated to the other ("Link Approach"). 4 A
referral mechanism through which the European regional courts could
cooperate would assure uniformity and clarity in European Human
Rights Law and thereby promote international human rights law in
general. It would positively develop the political and legal identity of
Europe. 5
Time and again, on both the national and supranational scale,
constitutions and courts have recognized the value of a "single
ultimate judicial interpreter."'8
In the Van Gend en Loos decision,
the ECJ cited the value of uniform application of international law.' 87
The integrity of the European fundamental rights protection project
rests on the uniform interpretation of European human rights law.'
Unfortunately, the Link Approach, like the Accession Approach,
180. See Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 118.
18 1. See id.

182. Id. at 118-19.
183. See supra Parts I.B.1-2.
184. See generally Janis, supra note 144 (suggesting a procedural link between the
ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights).
185. See id. at 212.
186. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. Ill (asserting that the "judicial power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish") (emphasis added); Janis,
supra note 144, at 214 ("[It makes sense both for the success and for the fairness of
the legal system of the European Convention on Human Rights that a single court be
responsible for giving a final interpretation of European Human Rights Law."); see
also supra Part I.A.2.
187. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
188. See Janis, supra note 144, at 214.
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requires a power concession by the ECJ and, as such, fails to provide a
realistic solution to the two-court problem."8'
3. The EU Cannot Stop Divergence-The EU Can Only Hope To
Contain It
A third approach, aimed at limiting divergent ECHR
interpretations by the two courts rather than eliminating them
altogether, may be more practical ("Limiting Approach"). The
Limiting Approach would establish a system of fundamental rights
protection within the EU that promises to meet or exceed the
protection afforded by the ECHR, while ensuring that the
Luxembourg Court does not develop a jurisprudence affording less
protection and at odds with that of the Strasbourg Court. This
approach would render the two-court problem theoretical by
significantly reducing the potential for any actual conflict between the
two courts. The Nice Charter contains the necessary elements for
effectuating the Limiting Approach, making the Charter a potent tool
in the quest for consistent application of the ECHR at the EU level.9
III. A HARMONIZING FORCE IN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
PROTECTION

Although discussions of the Accession' 9 ' and Link' 92 Approaches
are well documented," 3 the less visited Limiting Approach' 94 provides
the best solution to the problem of divergent ECHR interpretations.'95
Community case law reveals the ECJ's unwillingness to consider the
Accession Approach because, to the Court, it represents an
unacceptable grant of review to an outside body.' 9' The same
concerns doom the Link Approach. 9 ' On the other hand, the
Limiting Approach shows promise, and the Nice Charter will
effectuate its solution by harmonizing the divergent regional
fundamental rights jurisprudences of the two courts.
A. The ECJ's Refusal To Share
The Accession and Link Approaches both provide real solutions to
the two-court problem, but neither approach offers a realistic solution.
This section outlines the objections to the Accession and Link
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See infra Part III.A.2.
See infra Part III.B.
See supra Part II.B.I.
See supra Part 11.B.2.
See infra Parts III.A.I-2.
See supra Part II.B.3.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part I1.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
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Approaches, and concludes that the jurisprudence of the ECJ suggests
that neither approach will resolve the two-court problem.
1. Still No Accession in Sight
The ECJ's unwillingness to compromise its supremacy in the realm
of EU law is the main obstacle to the Accession Approach.' While it
is important for the ECJ to guard its primacy within the EU legal
system, its fears concerning the implications of accession may be
unfounded."' The ECJ has already accepted the possibility of the
Community being subject to an outside body's review, provided that
the outside body did not interfere with the autonomy of the
Community legal order.2 ' This suggests that no problem exists in
principle with EU accession to the ECHR. 2 ' The concern then shifts
to whether the Strasbourg Court threatens to undermine the
autonomy of the Community legal order. It does not.2' 2 Decisions of
the Strasbourg Court would not directly repeal or affect any
Community legislation, leaving the autonomy of the Community legal
order intact under the ECHR in much the same way the Convention
preserves the national constitutional order of each Council of
Europe2 ' 3 member.2 4

198. See supra notes 97-98, 124-25 and accompanying text.
199. See Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 113-15.
200. See Case 1/91, Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, 1991
E.C.R. 1-6079, 6082 ("The Community's competence in the field of international
relations and its capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entails the
power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created by such an agreement as
regards the interpretation and application of its provisions.").
201. See Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 114.
202. See Weiler, supro note 8, at 620 ("lilt is doubtful if the European Court of
Human Rights would find much to criticize in the approach of the European Court of
Justice but the availability of an instance of appeal would have a symbolic value the
significance of which should not be underestimated.").
203. The Council of Europe describes itself as:
an intergovernmental organisation which aims: to protect human rights,
pluralist democracy and the rule of law: to promote awareness and
encourage the development of Europe's cultural identity and diversity; to
seek solutions to problems facing European society (discrimination against
minorities, xenophobia, intolerance, environmental protection, human
cloning, Aids, drugs, organised crime, etc.); to help consolidate democratic
stability in Europe by backing political, legislative and constitutional reform.
An Overview, at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Conimunication /5Fand°/,5FResearch/
Contacts%5Fwith %5Fthe %5Fpublic/About %5FCouncil % 5Fof'% 5FEurope/An/,,5F
overview/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
204. See Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 114-15. Decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights do not enter into direct effect within the separate legal
systems of the signatory states. See id. The states must employ further legislative
action in order to implement these decisions. See id. In this way the Convention
preserves the independent constitutional orders of each of the states, although the
signatories have relinquished sonie sovereignty in order to grant review power to the
court in Strasbourg. See id. at 115.
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Accession to the ECHR also raises a textual concern. One may
question whether the Convention's text, in its existing form, readily
applies to a multinational organization such as the EU.2 5 The text of
the ECHR contains many concepts presupposing its members'
statehood.12 " Terms such as "national security '21 " and "territorial
integrity" 215 assume potential signatories meet the qualifications of
statehood. However, such concepts easily apply to the structure and
interests of the Community and, as such, do not establish a meaningful
block to EU accession. 9
Accession also presents a procedural problem. EU accession to the
ECHR would create a scenario of "double representation" within the
21
institutions of the ECHR for each state that also belongs to the EU. )
This, too, presents only a theoretical problem, because the
Convention charges each of the judges on the Strasbourg Court (much
like the justices of the ECJ) to act independently of national
pressures-to act impartially, not as a political representative of the
nation from which she came.2 '
Ultimately, the only valid consideration accession to the ECHR
raises concerns the length of time it would take to resolve litigation
involving fundamental rights. 212 The ECHR requires exhaustion of all
domestic remedies available to an individual before admitting a
matter to the Strasbourg Court." 3 EU accession to the ECHR would
create huge delays in the adjudication of fundamental rights cases by
placing an entire additional judicial framework between the individual
and the Strasbourg Court.2 14
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. ECHR, supra note 10, arts. 6(1), 8(2), 10(2). 11(2).
208. Id. art. 10(2).
209. See Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 115-16 ("[T]he need to restrict certain
rights on the grounds of an overriding interest applies to the Community no less than
to sovereign States."). The terms in question -"national security," "territorial
integrity," and "economic well-being of the country"-all appear in clauses allowing
restriction of rights found in the ECHR, making it easy to find analogues in the EU.
See id. "National security" finds an equivalent in "[supranational or EU-wide]
security." See ECHR, supra note 10, arts. 6(1), 8(2), 10(2), 11(2). The analogue to
"territorial integrity" would refer to the sum territory of the Member States. See id.
art. 10(2). "Economic well-being of the country" becomes "economic well-being of
the IEU I."See id. art. 8(2).
210. See Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 116.
211. See id. at 117. That is to say, judges on the European Court of Human Rights
who take seriously their role as non-political, independent jurists create no instance of
single representation upon which to build a concern over double representation. Still,
the text of the ECHR suggests an obvious wariness about equal representation in the
Convention itself -otherwise it would not call for one judge from each member state.
212. See id.
213. See ECHR, supra note 10, art. 35(l) (stating that the Strasbourg Court may
only deal with a matter "after all domestic remedies have been exhausted").
214. See Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 117. The framework of the Convention
would have to consider the ECJ a national court, so a cause of action in Strasbourg
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With the only valid concern regarding EU accession to the ECHR
focusing on the increased time in deciding fundamental rights cases,
the debate should be narrowed to an evaluation of: (1) the gains of
increasing democratic legitimacy within the EU and eliminating
potential conflict and confusion between the two international courts,
versus (2) the inherent procedural delay in resolving cases brought
under the Convention should the EU accede.1 5 The ECJ, however,
has indicated a lack of willingness to subject itself to review by the
Strasbourg Court.1 8 In the end, the ECJ's objections, however
unfounded, prevent EU accession to the ECHR from becoming a
viable solution.
2. The Unlikelihood of a Link
The dissimilar characters of the regional international legal systems
of the EU and the Council of Europe present an obstacle to the Link
Approach.2 17 Members of the Council of Europe outnumber EU
Member States almost three to one. 1 8 Some question whether the
Strasbourg Court, with a judge from each member state of the
Council, should pass judgments affecting the smaller subsection of EU
Member States. 219 In theory, the ECJ can better address the needs of
its smaller region and, as such, will likely pass judgments conflicting
with those of the Strasbourg
Court, which must take a broader
22
approach to its decisions. 11
could only commence after a ruling by the ECJ. Id. Cases involving fundamental
rights begin with individuals in national courts, meaning ECJ involvement occurs only
with an Article 234 request for a preliminary ruling. See supra notes 38, 40-45 and
accompanying text. In some cases, an exhaustion of domestic remedies will mean a
case will go all the way from a nation's constitutional court-at which point the court
will be obligated to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ if the matter concerns
Community law-to the ECJ, and then to the Strasbourg Court. See id. With cases
taking approximately eighteen months to be decided at the ECJ level, and five years
to be decided under the ECHR, due to an increasingly packed docket, the Courts
could incur huge delays in the process of adjudicating fundamental rights claims. See
Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 117.
215. See Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 113-17.
216. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
217. See Lawson, supra note 7, at 216.
218. At the time of this writing, there were forty-four members of the Council of
Europe, versus fifteen for the European Union. See Council of Europe, at
http://www.coe.int/portalT.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2003); The European Union at a
Glance, at http://europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003). Granted, the
continual expansion of the EU could result in a larger overlap of membership.
Nevertheless, the fact that membership in the EU requires a much more significant
compromise of state sovereignty than membership in the Council of Europe makes it
difficult to imagine that membership in the EU would reach that of the Council.
219. See Janis, supra note 144, at 216 (asking whether the European Court of
Human Rights, with judges from forty-four Council of Europe states should render
authoritative judgments affecting a Community of fifteen states).
220. See id. (recognizing the argument that it would be "right and proper" for the
ECJ to give a sub-regional interpretation of the ECHR at odds with the jurisprudence
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Carried out to its logical extreme, this objection would apply to a
Strasbourg Court ruling at odds with national legislation violating the
Convention, and argues against any agreement that establishes an
that an
proposition
mechanism-a
oversight
international
international court should not dictate anything to a national court,
which undoubtedly responds better to the needs of the nation it
serves.22 If the ECJ were to rely on the national constitutional
traditions of its member states-as it promised to do-it would
enforce a stricter standard of fundamental rights protection than that
afforded by the ECHR, making the representation objection
invalid.222
As with the Accession Approach, the only truly salient issue
involves the time it takes to adjudicate claims. 223 For the same reasons
EU accession to the ECHR could create an increased amount of time
devoted to adjudicating fundamental rights claims, the addition of a
referral mechanism between the courts could cause similar delays if a
referral happens late in a case. 2 4 A referral mechanism also may
unduly burden the docket of one or both courts, producing further
procedural delays.225
The current systems also create time-consuming scenarios in which
a claimant may bring a second cause of action subsequent to an ECJ
or Strasbourg Court ruling on the same matter. 226 This second course
of litigation entails more costs and time than a referral during the
original proceeding. 227 Unlike a pure accession scenario, a referral
of the Strasbourg Court because the two Courts represent different constituencies).
221. This proposition is directly contradicted by the fact that EU Member States
have submitted themselves to a number of international courts. While these states
have expressed concerns about the adequacy of protection international courts
provide, they do not object in principle to the existence of these courts.
222. See Janis, supra note 144, at 216 ("[Rleal conflict on human rights law in
general would usually only be a problem when the interpretation of European
Human Rights Law by the Luxembourg Court was laxer than the interpretation of the
Strasbourg Court."). As much as the potential exists for ECJ interpretations at odds
with those of the Strasbourg Court, it still seems as if this should not happen. After
all, the EU, in its treaty framework, has charged the ECJ with interpreting the
provisions of the ECHR. This suggests that it seeks to build a minimum standard of
protection that incorporates the ECHR standard. With this in mind, the smaller size
of the EU, relative to the Council of Europe, should plausibly lead to an ability to
pass more protective legislation than the ECHR requires. Problems arise when the
integrationist motives of the ECJ cause it to reduce the scope of the guarantees of the
ECHR in its interpretations, causing actual scenarios in which the courts'
interpretations stack up in such a way that the Strasbourg interpretation affords more
protection than that issued by Luxembourg. For more discussion on this point, see
supra Part II.A.
223. See Janis, supra note 144, at 217.
224. See id.; see also supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
225. See Janis, supra note 144, at 217; see also supra notes 211-13 and
accompanying text.
226. See Janis, supra note 144, at 217.
227. See id.
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system could eliminate redundancy and allow cases to be resolved
earlier and in accordance with both international courts.225
Ultimately, this may be the best answer, enabling a vital discourse on
the interpretation and application of the ECHR by two legitimate
courts with differing expertise. 9 The problem remains that, until
both of the courts are willing to relinquish their ultimate authorities
within their relative areas
of expertise, a link between the two remains
23
a political impossibility. 1
B. To the Rescue: The Nice Charter Presents a Viable Solution to the
Two-Court Problem
Without eliminating the two-court problem altogether, the EU can
only hope to reduce the amount of divergence between the two courts
by raising the level of fundamental rights protection in the EU, and
harmonizing the jurisprudences of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg
Courts.2"3' The Nice Charter outlines a system of rights protection
within the EU that should solve the two-court problem in exactly this
way.232 To achieve a heightened level of rights protection sensitive to
the needs of modern Europe,233 the Charter includes a comprehensive
catalogue of fundamental rights. 2 4 and incorporates the jurisprudence
235
of the Strasbourg Court into EU law.
Even in its preamble, the Nice Charter affirms a higher protection
level than the ECHR; it incorporates all of the rights recognized
therein and more. 2" The Charter's text includes enumerated rights,
'
"Freedoms," 23grouped into six main categories: "Dignity,"237
' "Solidarity," 24 "Citizens' Rights, '241' and "Justice. '242
"Equality,"2 39
These enumerated rights cover more ground than the ECHR,
228. See id.
229. See id. at 213.
230. Cf Betten & Grief, supra note 124, at 113-15 (noting that the ECJ's argument
that the subjection of the Community to another international system of courts does
not fit with past ECJ opinions).
231. See supra Part 11.B.3.
232. See generally Charter, supra note 14.
233. Sacerdoti, supra note 126, at 43 (noting that the Charter "aims to strengthen
the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress
and scientific and technological developments"' (quoting Charter, supra note 14)).
234. See generally Charter, supra note 14 (adopting the case law of the Strasbourg
Court in the Preamble, and continuing to enumerate rights in 50 Articles); Sacerdoti,
supra note 126, at 43 (claiming that the Charter provides a comprehensive rights
protection scheme unparalleled in the past fifty years).
235. See Charter, supra note 14, Preamble.
236. See id.
237. Id. arts. 1-5.
238. Id. arts. 6-19.
239. Id. arts. 20-26.
240. Id. arts. 27-38.
241. Id. arts. 39-46.
242. Id. arts. 47-50.
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including modern rights necessitated by growth in technology and
24 3
socioeconomic rights guaranteed in the European Social Charters.
The comprehensive nature of the Nice Charter as a codification of
fundamental rights establishes a crucial foundation that enables the
EU to implement an equal or higher fundamental rights protection
standard than that provided under the ECHR.244
Perhaps more important to the resolution of the two-court problem,
the preamble text incorporates the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights. 2 5 The Charter thus normalizes ECJ interpretation of
the ECHR to that of the Strasbourg Court.246 In the future, each
Court will draw upon the same Strasbourg jurisprudence, minimizing
ECHR
divergent
grossly
continuing
of
possibility
the
247
If successful, this minimization, coupled with the
interpretations.
higher protection standard provided in the Charter, ultimately should
render the two-court problem purely theoretical.
C. The Charter in Practice: Does It Work? Will It Work?
To predict the ability of the Nice Charter to resolve the issue of
conflicting supranational human rights courts in Europe, one must
243. The European Social Charters include the Council of Europe's European
Social Charter and the non-binding Community Charter of the Fundamental Social
Rights of Workers. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 56. These Social Charters inspired
many of the social and economic rights found in the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights, whereas the ECHR provides most of the civil and political
rights. See id. at 50-56.
244. See infra Part III.C.1.
245. See Charter, supra note 14, Preamble. The preamble states:
This Charter reaffirms ... the rights as they result, in particular, from the
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the
Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties,
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and
by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.
Id. (emphasis added).
246. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 52 ("Taking over dispositions of the ECHR and
the European Social Charter means a reception, i.e., the normativisation of
dispositions already existing in a legal order distinct from that of the EC/EU.").
247. Of course, the Courts will undoubtedly come to different conclusions on some
issues, much like different federal circuit courts do in the United States. Unlike the
federal system in the U.S., the European court system prior to the Nice Charter was
analogous to a system of two circuit courts allowed to continue without the possibility
of higher review. See supra Part 1I. Although the Charter does not place either court
in Europe at the direct mercy of the other, it does establish a system for correction.
When the two Courts take different approaches to interpreting the ECHR, the
approach taken by the Strasbourg Court, by virtue of the Charter, will become
precedent for the ECJ. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 54-55 (explaining that the
Charter "envisions a reception of the Strasbourg jurisprudence" such that "divergent
interpretation at the different levels of fundamental rights protection in Europe" is
avoided). This reception will harmonize the jurisprudences of the two Courts to a
certain degree.
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evaluate the Charter in its current non-binding sense,24 and as
potentially binding within the EU's constitutional framework 241 should

the Member States ratify the Charter next year.251 Naturally, the
Charter will provide the most effective protection as a binding
catalogue of fundamental rights for the European Union.25 I The EU
can, however, glean some immediate benefit from the Charter.
Judges within the EU likely will look to the Charter for inspiration

in their fundamental rights interpretations, making the Charter a
potent source of "soft law. ' 253 Recent EU case law already reflects

this.254 The ECJ's recent use of the Charter as an inspirational guide

248. At this point, the Charter does not constitute part of the constitutional treaty
framework of the EU, making it "an act of self-obligation" for the Member States,
rather than binding law that can be invoked before the ECJ. See id. at 48.
249. There are three ways for the Charter to become binding law within the EU:
integrate it into the principle text of the existing EC/EU Treaty itself: "add[] it as all
annex to the EC Treatyl;]" or "leav[e] it outside the Treaty," but place a reference to
the Charter in the text of the Treaty. See Arnold, sutpra note 89, at 48.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 50 (noting that, if accepted by the people of the EU, the Charter
"would assume the highest rank in the hierarchy of norms, superior even to the EC
primary law").
252. See Carol Harlow, Voices of Difference in a Plural Comnmunity, 50 Am. J.
Comp. L. 339, 362 (2002) ("A European Charter of Rights can only accelerate the
process of convergence.").
253. See Editorial Comments, 38 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1,6 (2001). The comments
suggest that:
[w]ithin the Union, it is very likely that the Charter, a document negotiated
by the political entities-representatives of Member States, the Commission,
the European Parliament and national parliaments- reproducing rights
which are already accepted either as Community law or as expressing a
common view of Member States, and proclaimed during a European Council
and then published as an interinstitutional agreement, will inspire the judges
in their interpretation of fundamental rights, even if it is only 'soft law'.
There is no reason why European judges should not use it as a source of
inspiration, in the same way as they have used the ECHR.
Id.
254. See, e.g., Joined Cases T-377, T-379 & T-380/00, T-260 & T-272/01, Phillip
Morris Int'l Inc. v. Commission, I C.M.L.R. 21 (2003) (noting that, although the
Charter is not legally binding, "it showed the importance of the rights it set out in the
Community legal order"); Case T-321/02, Vannieuwenhuyze-Morin v. Parliament,
O.J. 2003 C7/21 (2003) (citing the right to freedom of expression mentioned in Article
II of the Charter); Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health, ex parte
British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd., Celex No. 601J0491 (2002) (referring
to the right to property as "enshrined" in Article 17 of the Nice Charter); Case C223/02, Republic of Finland v. Parliament, O.J. 2002 C202/10 (2002) (citing Article
15(1) of the Charter-freedom to pursue an occupation); Case C-206/02 LR af 1998
A/S v. Commission (appealing Case T-23/99) (overturning a prior decision at odds
with Article 7 ECHR, "as introduced in EC law by Article 49 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union"); see also Case C-94/00, Roquette
Fr res SA v. Directeur general de la concurrence, la consommation et de la
repression des fraudes, Celex No. 600J0094 (2002) (referring to the case-law of the
Strasbourg Court in order to clarify the scope of ECHR Article 8, which had been
previously interpreted differently by the two courts); Joined Cases C-238, C-244, C245, C-247, C-250, C-252 & C-254/99. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) v.
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identifies a slow but significant process by which the ideals
encompassed in the Charter will begin to take effect within the EU 5
This suggests that the Charter has the potential to remedy the twocourt problem, even in its current incarnation as a non-binding
declaration of the European Council.
Better still, a binding Nice Charter would give EU citizens an
effective means to enforce their fundamental rights against EU
legislation.25 6 This would ensure even further the ECJ's regular
application of the Charter. 7 In either scenario, the Charter will
influence positively the development of fundamental rights protection
within the EU legal system.25 s That being the case, one must analyze
both the Charter's textual implications, and its practical application
thus far, in order to determine whether the Charter will, in fact,
resolve the confusion and conflict between the Strasbourg and
Luxembourg Courts.
1. Does the Charter Truly Signal a Higher Standard of Rights
Protection Within the EU?
To resolve the two-court problem in Europe, the Charter must
establish a minimum standard of rights protection within the EU that
equals or surpasses that provided by the ECHR.25 9 By so doing, the
EU, although not a signatory to the Convention, would act in
accordance with the Convention's aims by invoking a level of
protection that meets and exceeds that found in the ECHR.26
Consistent application of the Charter standard in the EU will ensure
that the ECJ always upholds the ECHR minimum standard, as the
former includes the latter.26'
Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 1-8375 (citing repeatedly judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights and using the Strasbourg case-law to determine standards of
interpretation); Case C-62/00, Marks & Spencer plc v. Comm'rs of Customs & Excise,
Celex No. 600C0062, para. 74 (2002) (using the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights to determine that "lain excessively short period for lodging an
action has been held ... to be contrary to the Convention").
255. Armin von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organization?
Human Rights and the Core of the European Union, 37 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1307,
1307-08 (2000) ("The solemn declaration of such a charter, whatever its provisional or
its final legal status, might be part of an ongoing process that has the potential to
transform substantially the Union and its legal system.").
256. Widmann, supra note 9, at 345 ("Acquiring full effect would bring the Charter
to bear upon the EU's institutions and offer EU citizens an effective means of
enforcing their rights either in national courts or before the ECJ." (citing Editorial
Comments, 38 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1,5 (2001))).
257. See id.
258. See supra Part I.C.
259. See supra notes 231-44 and accompanying text.
260. Imagine a Venn diagram where the circle representing the Charter standard of
fundamental rights protection completely encompasses a smaller circle that represents
the ECHR standard.
261. See Widmann, supra note 9, at 347-48; see also Charter, supra note 14, art.
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One could argue that the Charter only nominally establishes such a
higher standard. r2 This argument focuses on Article 53 of the
Charter, which, in the case of divergent standards, allows existing
national and international human rights protection standards that
provide greater protection than EU standards to prevail. 26 3 In other
words, the EU rights protection scheme would mimic the "uniform
moveable standard" of rights protection provided by the ECHR-in
cases where higher protection levels than those proposed by the EU
already existed within the Member States, the stronger standard
would win. 2" This model of rights protection disturbs those who
believe supremacy, one of the principal
doctrines of the Community
69
legal order, hinges upon uniformity.
Supremacy does not, however, hinge on uniformity. One must
consider that the Charter principally aims to establish a minimum
fundamental rights protection standard for the EU.21 ' Article 53 does
not undermine this purpose. 267 The EU standard prevails in the
uniform moveable standard model, because the stricter national
standard, by default, meets the laxer Community standard-much in
the way that by applying the Charter, the EU ensures compliance with
the ECHR.6 8
Some argue that this type of rights analysis, comparing different
rights protection systems to determine which guarantees a higher
protection level, comes from a "misconceived perception" as to the
quantifiability of human rights. 26' Although protecting human rights
52(3) (establishing that the EU must afford equivalent, if not greater, protection to
those rights derived from the ECHR).
262. See Widmann, supra note 9, at 35 1.
263. Article 53 reads:
Nothing in this Charter shall he interpreted as restricting or adversely
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their
respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by
international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the
Member States are party, including the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the
Member States' constitutions.
Charter, supra note 14, art. 53.
264. See Widmann, supra note 9, at 348.
265. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the
Role of the European Court ojiustice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights
Within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1103, 1122-23
(1986) (noting that, if the EU were to bow to the specificity of any national legal
order, "the cardinal principle of supremacy" would be destroyed).
266. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 58 (noting that Charter article 52(3) "allows
European Union Law to have a more extensive protection than laid down by the
Convention").
267. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text. Contra Widmann, supra note 9
(arguing that Article 53 undermines the Charter's impact).
268. See Widmann, supra note 9, at 351; supra Part lII.B.
269. See Widmann, supra note 9, at 353 (basing her argument on a discussion found
in Ronald Dworkin's book, Taking Rights Seriously (1977)).
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does require a society to balance competing interests that may be
specific to that society, 27 it must still be possible to compare rights
protection standards against one another.'
Otherwise, it would be
impossible to ascertain whether legislation protecting fundamental
272
rights complies with local constitutional or international standards.
In more complex cases involving conflicting rights, or those that
tend to receive protection at levels inversely proportional to one
another, a seesaw effect will occur.273 Raising the protection standard
for one right will reduce the ability to uphold the protection standard
for the conflicting right.274 Should this standard dip below the
minimum standard established by the ECHR and embraced by the
Charter, the Charter will correct the standard,
thereby lowering the
275
protection level of the competing right.
The Commission drafted the Charter intending to enforce the
ECHR standard for rights derived from the Convention, and to add
protection for rights drawn from other sources.26 This allows for two
possible interpretations of the Charter's text: (1) that concurrent
enforcement of all the rights, with the scope prescribed by the ECHR
for those concerned, is feasible, or (2) that the Charter would
represent, at the very least, a codification at the EU level of the rights
protected by the ECHR, with any rights presently in conflict with the
protection level afforded by ECHR standards left as aspirations.277
270. Id.
271. If it were impossible to compare rights protection standards, one would be
unable to determine when a violation of one's rights has taken place. Deeming a
state's laws in violation of a constitutional standard requires making a judgment,
perhaps one right at a time, about whether that state's overall rights protection
standard meets the constitutional standard. This judgment necessarily compares the
two standards of protection.
272. See supra note 271.
273. See Widmann, supra note 9, at 355 (noting "fundamental rights cannot be
ranked against one another"). A good example of conflicting rights would be the
right to education, see Charter, supra note 14, art. 14, and the right to social security
and social assistance, see Charter, supra note 14, art. 34. Programs established to
provide these rights to individuals inevitably draw their resources from the same finite
pool. Increasing the level of protection for one would reduce the ability to protect the
other. Again, Widmann's illustration of the problem fails to provide a convincing
argument. She suggests that the protection of some of the socioeconomic rights found
in the Nice Charter, and not in the ECHR, could result in reduced protection given to
rights derived from the ECHR, see Widmann, supra note 9, at 355, while ignoring that
much of the Charter seeks to create uniformity between the ECHR and the
autonomous EU standard. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 58-59. But see Widmann,
supra note 9, at 355.
274. See Widmann, supra note 9, at 355.
275. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 58 (noting that the scope of the Charter rights
which correspond to ECHR rights shall be identical).
276. These sources include "the constitutional traditions and international
obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the
Community Treaties .... [and] the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by
the Council of Europe." See Charter, supra note 14, Preamble.
277. See Charter, supra note 14. To suggest that the Charter does not uphold at
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Both interpretations suggest that, despite the existence of conflicting
rights within the Charter, the EU and its Member States will
ultimately strike a desired balance that, at the very least, affords the
minimum ECHR protection standard to all rights.278
When determining whether the Nice Charter establishes a more
protective standard than the ECHR, critics may level a more serious
allegation-that the Charter will restrict, not enhance, fundamental
rights protection within the Member States. 27 1 In certain cases, EU
legislation that meets Charter standards probably will provide less
protection than that afforded at the national level within some
Member States.28 When Member States apply EU legislation at the
national level, an act in accordance with the Charter's provisions may
supplant stronger existing rights-protective national legislation and
restrict fundamental rights protection within that State.28 '
Although this means that Article 53 fails as a savings clause in the
traditional sense, designed to ensure consistency among prior
fundamental rights instruments and standards in effect at the time of
ratification, the Nice Charter does not fail to advance the cause of
fundamental rights protection in Europe. Absent the Charter, the EU
would still threaten to restrict rights protection at the national level,
except without a comprehensive professed autonomous EU rights
protection standard.2 3 With the Charter, the EU guarantees that,
even when restricting rights protection within the Member States, the
standard will never drop sufficiently to force unwarranted deviation
from the ECHR.28 4
2. Can the Charter Effectively Normalize the Courts' Jurisprudences?
Having established that the Nice Charter does allow for a rights
protection standard equal to or greater than that provided by the
ECHR, the remaining concern involves the scope of protection
afforded under the Charter. Where the scope of protection between
two rights protection schemes differs,2 5 a measurably higher
least the standard prescribed by the ECHR would render the entire document
superfluous.

278. See Widmann, supra note 9, at 355-56.
279. See id. at 351.
280. See id. at 350-51.
281. Id. at 351-52.

282. Id. at 356 ("A savings clause meant for supervisory international regimes is
unworkable in a system where supranational powers implement policies bearing
directly upon signatory states.").
283. See supra Part I.A.2.
284. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 89, at 58-59 (describing the Charter's ability to
afford a higher standard of protection than the ECHR); Widmann, supra note 9, at
351 (noting that '[wlhen national and regional laws conflict, supremacy requires
regional standards to prevail").
285. See Widmann, supra note 9, at 353. Widmann refers to "divergent judgments
rendered by the ECHR and ECJ" as an example of conflict caused by divergent
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protection standard must contain the entirety of the scope of the
minimum protection standard. Article 52(3) of the Charter, directly
addresses the issue of scope.2" 6
The Nice Charter incorporates and enumerates all the rights
protected under the ECHR.2 7
Now the critical determination
involves whether the Charter takes the all-important step of
eliminating divergent rulings from the Strasbourg and Luxembourg
Courts that would afford lower rights protection levels within the EU.
Only then can the Charter avoid the risk of falling short when it comes
to dictating the enforceable scope of a right
and, therefore, present a
2
viable solution to the two-court problem. 11
As clearly as the text of the Charter incorporates protection of the
civil and political rights of the ECHR,2 9 the Charter also clearly aims
to establish a consistent interpretation of the ECHR by both courts
charged with the Convention's interpretation.2 9 ° Should the Member
States ratify the Charter into the EU's constitutional treaty
framework, they will proclaim a legally binding commitment to
harmonized ECHR jurisprudences. 91 The question then becomes
whether this commitment achieves the goal of harmonization. Recent
292
EU case history suggests that it will.
An exemplar of the Charter's potential to resolve divergent
interpretations of the scope of fundamental rights protection under
the ECHR is Roquette Fr~res SA v. Directeurgeneral.293 In this case,
the ECJ, invoking the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
scopes of rights protection. Id. at 354. She mistakenly uses a pair of cases decided in
1989 and 1992 to illustrate a problem raised by Charter Article 52(3), which ties the
scope of the rights protected in the Charter to the scope recognized at the time of the
Convention. See id. The Charter, brought about in 2000, holds with it the potential to
prevent such issues of differing scope from occurring in the future. In fact, the ECJ,
citing the Charter, corrected the divergent scopes of protection in these exact cases
with its decision in Roquette Frres SA v. Directeur general de la concurrence, la
consommation et de la repression des fraudes. Case C-94/00, Celex No. 600J0094
(2002). For a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 293-302, and the
accompanying text.
286. Charter, supra note 14, art. 52(3) ("In so far as this Charter contains rights
which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights
shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.").
287. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 89, at 50 (noting that the Charter's concept of
fundamental rights is "essentially shaped by the ECHR"); Sacerdoti, supra note 126,
at 43 (suggesting that the ECHR's catalogue of rights appears "dated" next to the
Charter).
288. See supra Part lI.B.3; see also Arnold, supra note 89, at 54-58.
289. See supra text accompanying note 236.
290. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
291. See Arnold, supra note 89, at 48 ("The Charter would acquire through
incorporation into the Treaties the same legal force as primary law." (citation
omitted)).
292. See supra note 254.
293. Case C-94/00, Celex No. 600J0094 (2002).
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Rights, resolved a ten-year rift in the Courts' ECHR Article 8
interpretations.24
In a March 2000 case deciding whether Community law allowed
government authorized entry and seizure in a place of business for the
purpose of gathering inculpatory evidence ,2"5 a French court
recognized that the ECJ ruling in the Hoechst... case found nothing in
Community law suggesting the extension of the right of the
inviolability of the home to places of business, but also noticed that
the European Court of Human Rights ruling in the Niemietz 27 case
found that Article 8 protection did, indeed, extend to places of
business. 2" These observations prompted the court to petition the
ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
The ECJ, in its decision issued in October 2002, wrote: "[f]or the
purposes of determining the scope of [Article 8] in relation to the
protection of business premises, regard must be had to the case-law of
the European Court of Human Rights subsequent to the judgment in
Hoechst."3 " Looking to Strasbourg case law, the ECJ found that it
supported two principles: that Article 8 may be extended to cover
business premises in some cases, and that the right of interference
found in Article 8(2) may be more far-reaching where a place of
business is concerned.'.
Using these principles, derived from
Strasbourg case law in conflict with its own jurisprudence, the ECJ
issued its preliminary ruling, which acknowledged that Article 8
protection did extend to places of business and that national courts
could deny the Commission's request to search a place of business for
lack of sufficient cause. 3 2
294. See Dean Spielmann, Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and
Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Coinplementarities, in The EU
and Human Rights 757, 776 (Philip Alston ed., 1999). For a description of the
conflict, see supra text accompanying notes 158-63.
295. Case C-94/00, Roquette Frdres SA v. Directeur general de la concurrence, la
consommation et de larepression des fraudes, Celex No. 600J0094, grounds, para. 1-2
(2002).
296. Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859
(1989).
297. Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1992).
298. Roquette Frdres SA. Case C-94/00, grounds, para. 19-20.
299. See id. grounds, para. 21.
300. See id. grounds, para. 29 (italics added).
301. See id.
302. See id. Specifically, the Court held:
11it must he open to the competent national court to refuse to grant the
coercive measures applied for where the suspected impairment of
competition is so minimal, the extent of the likely involvement of the
undertaking concerned so limited, or the evidence sought so peripheral, that
the intervention in the sphere of the private activities of a legal person which
a search using law-enforcement authorities entails necessarily appears
manifestly disproportionate and intolerable in the light of the objectives
pursued by the investigation.
Id. grounds, para. 80.
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The Roquette Freres example illustrates perfectly how the Nice
Charter, by encouraging, and perhaps someday obligating, the ECJ to
look to the Strasbourg Court's case law, will reduce or possibly
eliminate diverging interpretations of the rights afforded by the
Convention that would result in an EU standard less protective than
that of the ECHR. 33 By so doing, the Charter will secure, at the very
least, the full scope of rights protection afforded by the ECHR.3 11
This would represent a tremendous advance for fundamental rights
protection in Europe, as it would serve the same purpose as EU
accession to the ECHR without requiring the ECJ to relinquish its
supremacy within the EU legal order." 5 At the same time, the
requisite attention paid by the ECJ to the Strasbourg jurisprudence
will bolster the authority of the European Court of Human Rights.""
CONCLUSION

Continued integration within the European Union has expanded
the scope of EU law into areas outside its original competence,
especially that of fundamental rights protection. What began as an
attempt to protect ECJ supremacy within the Community legal order
against threats mounted by national courts alleging inadequate human
rights protection in the original treaty system has blossomed into a
rich fundamental rights jurisprudence under the European Court of
Justice. This expansion of the scope of the ECJ's power creates the
potential for conflict and confusion, as Europe already has a court
with established legitimacy and competence in human rights
protection-the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
The future status of fundamental rights protection in the European
Union, and in all of Europe, rests on the two courts' ability to avoid
diverging interpretations detrimental to the application of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, and to ensure uniform minimum standards for
fundamental rights protection across Europe.
Assuming that the ECJ will not reverse its stance regarding the
grant of judicial review of Community functions to the Strasbourg
Court in certain cases, one solution remains: to create a guaranteed
EU fundamental rights standard equal or superior to that found
within the ECHR. This solution relegates the two-court problem to
the realm of theory by minimizing or eliminating the potential for
divergent interpretations affording less protection within the EU. In
order to function properly, such a standard must include a
comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights, enforceable within
303. See supra Part III.B.
304. See supra Part II1.B.
305. See supra Parts 1.B.2, l1.B.1, III.A.1.
306. There would still exist a minor possibility of harmful divergence, however
greatly reduced -and no longer a pressing concern.
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the EU, which meets or surpasses that found in the ECHR, and a
normalizing mechanism
to ensure
harmony between the
jurisprudences of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts with respect
to minimum fundamental rights protection standards. The European
Charter on Fundamental Rights, declared on December 7, 2000, at the
European Council meeting in Nice, meets these criteria. Whether or
not the EU Member States approve it for inclusion in the treaty
framework of the European Union in 2004, the Charter represents the
best and most realistic way to guarantee and strengthen individual
rights protection within Europe.
The Charter accomplishes this feat by including all the rights
protected by the ECHR, and more. Its self-proclaimed devotion to
the ECHR suggests that it seeks to maintain at least the Convention's
protection level for the rights derived from the ECHR, with the
possibility of expanding EU rights protection into the realm of
socioeconomic and group rights, or second- and third-generation
rights, respectively.
In so doing, the Charter leaves only the
possibility of diverging jurisprudences lessening the scope of the rights
protection afforded by the ECHR within the EU.
The Nice Charter deals handily with this problem, by creating
convergence with regard to the scope of fundamental rights standards
as outlined in the ECHR, and incorporating the entire existing
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court into that of the ECJ. In this
manner, the Charter obligates the ECJ to honor the case law
precedent of the European Court of Human Rights without making
the Luxembourg Court subordinate to the Strasbourg Court.
Conversely, competing interpretations of ECHR provisions issued
from Luxembourg that reduce the scope of protection afforded under
the Convention will no longer undermine the authority of the
European Court of Human Rights.
In these respects, the Charter properly resolves the two-court
problem. Already, as a non-binding declaration, the Charter unifies
the courts' ECHR interpretations, thereby granting force and
legitimacy to both supranational courts and to the fundamental rights
they seek to protect. To increase the Nice Charter's impact, the
Member States should ratify the Charter, giving it binding legal force
within the EU. Binding or not, the Nice Charter promises to
accelerate the process of bringing uniformity to ECHR interpretation,
leaving the EU and the rest of Europe to pursue even loftier human
rights projects.

